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Abstract
There is substantial heterogeneity in the gender gaps in unemployment across
OECD countries. We incorporate labor market conditions, moral hazard and home
production into a quantitative model of unemployment. The model can explain
most of the gender gaps in unemployment across the OECD countries. We nd
that each component is quantitatively important to match the gender gaps in
unemployment.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the gender gaps in unemployment across OECD countries. To
illustrate the data, we plot the gender gaps in unemployment across countries in Figure
1. As can be seen from the gure, there is a large variation across countries (between
-1.4% (United Kingdom) and 10.5% (Spain)). The gender gaps in unemployment are
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also very persistent. To give just one example, the gender gap in unemployment in Spain
has been around 10 % for the last 20 years (see Figure 1 for the other countries). In the
literature, while closely related questions such as gender gaps in wages and labor force
participation have been studied extensively, gender gaps in unemployment have not been
studied that much.1 One of the aims of this study is to ll this gap.
Motivated by the high level of persistence over time and the high degree of variation
in the gender gaps in unemployment across countries we postulate that the heterogeneity
and the persistence of labor market conditions are potential candidates for explaining the
observations. We build on the model developed in Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and
we incorporate labor market conditions into a quantitative search model to study the
employment-unemployment decisions of workers and the interactions of these decisions
with labor market conditions. We refer to earning tax rates, unemployment benet
levels and durations, average hours of work, average earnings and gender wage gap
by "labor market conditions." In our model, the population consists of two types of
innitely lived agents, men and women. The only di¤erence between men and women is
their pay levels (which we get from the data for each country) when they are employed.
Agents get job o¤ers from an exogenous process and they choose to be employed or
unemployed. Unemployed agents are able to partially smooth their consumption by doing
home production. They may also have unemployment benets depending on eligibility
and government monitoring. The level of monitoring is costly and is determined by how
much the government chooses to maximize average utility in the society.
For the numerical exercise, we solve the model for 21 OECD countries for which
we have data on labor market conditions. In addition to the standard parameters that
we borrow from the literature; tax rates, unemployment insurance replacement rates,
1Some studies on wage gender gap: Gunderson 1989, Blau and Kahn 1992,2003, and Black and
Spitz-Oener 2010. Some studies on labor force participation of females: Blundell et al. 2007, Fogli and
Veldkamp 2011, and Olivetti 2006.
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Figure 1: Gender Gaps in Unemployment Across OECD Countries
average hours of work, gender pay gaps and GDP per capita values are country s¼gecic
and we take them from the data. We assume that the level of home production is the
same for both genders and across countries.2 The model is successful in matching most
of the gender gaps across countries (Figure 2). The coe¢ cient of variation in the gender
gaps is 1.96 and 1.72 in the data and the model, respectively. Other than for France, the
calibrated versions of the model for the high and moderate gender gap countries match
the empirical data closely. In the data, the gender gap in France is around 3%; however,
the model generates a gender gap below 1%. Among the zero and negative gender gap
countries, the models performance is remarkable except for New Zealand and the United
Kingdom. Empirical gender gaps in these countries are -0.14% and -1.4%; however the
model generates 1.4% and 1%, respectively. This may be due to the fact that in the
model we use only a limited number of economic factors that would a¤ect gender gaps
2Note that without this assumption it would be possible to better match the data.
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in unemployment. Imposing more country-specic factors would probably improve the
results for the aforementioned countries. We perform additional quantitative exercises
to see the e¤ects of specic factors on the rate of the gender gap in unemployment.
The results indicate that high taxes, high replacement rates, high pay gaps and low
productivity levels are associated with high unemployment rates and gender gaps.
We make two important assumptions in the model. First, we do not include out of
the labor force as an employment status in the model (i.e., individuals are either em-
ployed or unemployed). The ndings of Azmat et al. (2006) provide empirical support
for this assumption. Using micro data from OECD countries, they nd that transitions
into and out of inactivity are not important in explaining the rate of unemployment. The
second assumption is the imperfect monitoring of the unemployment insurance qualica-
tion. Both the existence of imperfect monitoring and the signicant e¤ects of imperfect
monitoring on the unemployment levels have empirical support. Lalive et al. (2002)
show that the enforcement of the rules and the unemployment levels are negatively re-
lated. Johnson and Klepinger (1994) nd strong evidence that more stringent search
requirements reduce the unemployment spell. Dolton and ONeil (1996) study the e¤ect
of search requirements on unemployment using the Restart experiment performed in the
UK. They nd that the notication of monitoring had a statistically signicant positive
e¤ect on the transition from unemployment to employment.
This paper is closely related to Azmat, Guell and Manning (2006), who empirically
study the e¤ects of the following factors that can potentially explain observed gender
gaps across countries: (i) di¤erences in characteristics of the labor force, (ii) di¤erences in
transition rates in employment, unemployment and inactivity, (iii) prejudice or discrim-
ination, (iv) lower labor market experience of women, (v) hiring-ring costs (employers
prefer males as they are more likely to stick to their jobs), (vi) mismatch (the jobs women
want and the jobs available are di¤erent), (vii) maternity leave provisions, and (viii) pay
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gap. For all these scenarios either they nd some counter evidence or they nd small
e¤ects of these conditions on gender gaps in unemployment. In contrast to their empir-
ical exercise on labor market conditions, we jointly model labor market conditions and
home production to explain gender gaps in unemployment across countries. As a result
we are able to study the interactions of several key components of the labor market at
the same time, which provides an explanation to the gender gaps in unemployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives brief information about
the data. We provide a static model and some theoretical results in Section 3. We
specify a dynamic model economy in Section 4. and explain the calibration in Section 5.
In Section 6 we present the results. In Section 7 we propose some extensions for future
work and conclude.
2 Data
In this section we present cross-country data on labor market conditions and gender
gaps in unemployment. We obtain unemployment series from the OECD database.
Unemployment series are comparable across countries, because we use the harmonized
unemployment data, which provide unemployment series using the denition of the In-
ternational Labor Organization. We calculate 5-, 10- and 20-year averages of gender
gaps in unemployment and report them in Table 2. The table shows that there is sub-
stantial heterogeneity in gender gaps in unemployment across countries. The gender gap
in unemployment varies between -1.36% (United Kingdom) and 10.50% (Spain) across
countries. The coe¢ cient of variation in gender gaps in unemployment across OECD
countries is 1.96.
We obtained the values in Table 3 from the OECD database, which presents the rate
and potential duration of unemployment benets, average hours of work, taxes on earn-
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ings, and the mean and standard deviation of these variables across OECD countries.3
The standard deviation of these variables implies signicant dispersion in labor market
conditions across these countries.
Benet systems, which are summarized by the replacement rate and the duration,
vary quite dramatically across countries. Most of the European countries have benet
systems more generous than that of the US. The countries that have low replacement
rates tend to have longer duration of benets. Australia, the UK, New Zealand, and Ire-
land have the longest potential durations and the lowest replacement rates. On the other
hand, the countries with generous replacement rates tend to limit the duration. Sweden,
Portugal, Denmark, Norway, and some others, limit benets to shorter durations.
In Table 4, we report the gender pay gap and earning distribution of female and
male workers.4 The gender pay gap is dened as the ratio of female average earnings
over male average earnings; the lower this value is the higher the gender pay gap is. We
combine these empirical facts in a quantitative model and explain most of the gender
gaps in unemployment across OECD countries.
3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we present a static model and obtain theoretical results to develop an
intuition and to highlight the mechanisms of the dynamic model. The agents in this
economy choose whether to accept or reject a job o¤er. If an agent accepts a job o¤er,
he or she earns a market wage rate of y but he or she has to pay a  percent earning
tax. Labor is indivisible and each worker has to work h hours. If agents choose to reject
job o¤ers (a moral hazard problem), they will not earn any market wage but they can
3The unemployment benets are paid as a fraction of lost earnings which is called the replacement
rate."
4The calculation of the distribution is explained in detail in the Appendix.
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produce at home. We denote home production with ' and asset level with m. There
is an unemployment insurance system to support the involuntarily unemployed agents.
The unemployed agents who are entitled will receive unemployment insurance benets,
which are % of the after-tax market wage. We assume that the government cannot
perfectly monitor the agents:  percent of the agents who reject the job o¤ers still get
the unemployment insurance benet (a moral hazard problem).
The maximization problem is
MaxfVreject; Vacceptg
where
Vreject = U((1  )y +m+ '; 0) + (1  )U(m+ '; 0)
Vaccept = U((1  )y +m; 1  l):
In the above equations, U(:; :) is the utility function where the rst argument is con-
sumption and the second argument is leisure. We assume that the utility function is
additively separable in consumption and labor and it is logarithmic.
U((c; h) = log(c) + log(1  l)
where l is the level of the labor supply. The agents who reject the job o¤ers will get the
unemployment insurance benets with probability  and consume (1   )y + m + '
(we assume that home production and the market good are additive) if they receive
the benets. With probability (1  ) they will not receive unemployment benets and
consume m+'. Since they reject job o¤ers, they will not be supplying any labor which
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implies h = 0. If an agent accepts a job o¤er, his or her or his consumption will be
(1  )y +m and his or her labor supply will be h.
Agents will reject job o¤ers if Vreject > Vaccept. Imposing the functional form of the
utility function into the above condition, we get:
 log((1  )y +m+ ') + (1  ) log(m+ ') > log((1  )y +m) + log(1  l): (1)
After some simple algebra the condition simplies to:
[(1  )y +m+ '][m+ ']1  > [(1  )y +m](1  l): (2)
We use conditions 1 and 2 to derive the theoretical results of this section. We rst
start with the e¤ect of the unemployment insurance benet level (replacement rate) on
accepting or rejecting a job o¤er.
Proposition 1 Given other parameters, there exists a replacement rate  such that if
 >  the agents will reject the job o¤ers. Otherwise the agents will accept the job o¤ers.
The critical level of benet, , is
 =
( [(1 )y+m](1 l)
[m+']1  )
1
  m  '
(1  )y : (3)
Proof. Observe that the value of rejecting a job o¤er is increasing with the replacement
rate , whereas the value of accepting a job o¤er does not depend on the benet level.
Next, we equate the value of rejecting to the value of accepting a job o¤er to obtain a
closed-form solution shown in equation 3.
Proposition 2  decreases if home production, ', increases.
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Proof. This is easily seen from equation 3. If ' increases, the numerator deceases,
which decreases .
Suppose that there are two kinds of economies, one with home production, ', and
one with no home production. Keeping everything constant, agents in the rst economy
would have a lower  value. Therefore, a home production sector in an economy tends
to increase the fraction of agents who would reject job o¤ers. Moreover, interaction of
home production - as a mechanism that increases the value of being unemployed - with
labor market conditions would a¤ect the labor supply decision of workers even further.
Therefore, having a home production in our full model is quantitatively important.
Proposition 3 If (y + m)h > y + m + ', then there exists a tax level   such that
1 >   > 0, and if  >  , the agents will reject the job o¤ers. Otherwise they will not.
Proof. If  = 1, then the value of rejecting will be higher than the value of accepting,
since ' is positive and h is between 0 and 1.
m+ ' > mh
If  = 0, then using the assumption that (y +m)h > y +m + ', we obtain that the
value of accepting is larger than the value of rejecting. To see this, observe that (y+m)h
is the value of accepting a job o¤er when the tax rate is 0. The value of rejecting a job
o¤er in this case is [y +m+ '][m+ ']1 . The fact that y +m+ ' > m+ ' implies
y+m+' > [y+m+'][m+']1 . Since both values of rejecting and accepting are
continuous functions of  , then there should exist a   2 (0; 1) such that both functions
intersect. Since both functions are monotonic, they intersect only once, which implies
that if  >  , the agents will reject the job o¤ers; otherwise, they will not.
The condition (y +m)h > y +m + ' is imposed to guarantee that   is positive.
If we remove the condition, then it is possible that   will be negative. In such a case,
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for all values of possible taxes, the agents will reject the job o¤ers. The next proposition
shows how   changes with home productivity '.
Proposition 4 If h > , then   decreases if home production, ', increases.
Proof. The critical value of the tax,  , can be obtained by equating the value of
rejecting to the value of accepting.
 log((1   )y +m+ ') + (1  ) log(m+ ') = log((1   )y +m) + log(h) (4)
Implicitly di¤erentiating equation 4 gives
( @
@'
y +m+ 1)
(1   )y +m+ ' +
1  
m+ '
+
@
@'
y
(1   )y +m = 0:
Solving for @

@'
gives
@ 
@'
=
1 
m+'
+ (m+1)
(1 )y+m+'
y
(1 )y+m+'   y(1 )y+m
: (5)
The numerator of equation 5 is positive. The denominator of equation 5 is negative
if 
(1 )y+m+'   1(1 )y+m is negative (since  is smaller than 1). Dividing both the
numerator and the denominator of 
(1 )y+m+' with  gives the result that if
m+'

> m,
then 
(1 )y+m+'  1(1 )y+m will be negative. Since we assumed that home productivity,
', is positive and the replacement rate, , is smaller than 1, m+'

> m will always be
true. As a result, equation 5 implies that @

@'
is negative.
We now turn to the importance of asset level for the agentsaccepting or rejecting
decisions.
Proposition 5 There exists a critical asset level m such that if m > m, agents will
reject the job o¤ers. Otherwise they will accept.
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Proof. If the asset level goes to  ', the agents will accept the job o¤ers. In this case
consumption will go to zero, which pushes utility to  1 as we used log utility. If the
asset level goes to innity, the slope of Vreject goes to 1, whereas the slope of Vaccept is
h (it is constant and smaller than 1). As a result Vreject and Vaccept should intersect at
some m. The intersection point is m. As the slope of Vreject is larger than the slope of
Vaccept for the asset levels m > m; Vreject will be larger than Vaccept for m > m.
Proposition 5 implies that households with higher asset levels, keeping the other
factors constant, are more likely to reject the o¤ers and become unemployed. The reason
is that the richer households can use their assets to insure against the possibility that
they do not get insurance after rejecting.
4 Dynamic Model
We consider labor market conditions, moral hazard, and home production as potential
determinants of gender gaps in unemployment and incorporate them into a quantitative
model of unemployment to explain gender gaps across countries. The model is built
on Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and extended with home production, endogenous
government monitoring over job o¤ers, and wage dispersion.
Ex-ante Heterogeneity in the Population The population consists of a contin-
uum of innitely lived agents that are heterogeneous regarding their earnings. Women
have lower average earnings than men.5 Ex-ante, we have three groups in the society,
namely, f(yij)g, where i 2 ff;mg , and j 2 fL;M;Hg. Each gender has three earning
groups, low(L), medium(M), and high(H).6
5The pay gap between males and females is a well established result in the empirical literature. See
Kunze 2000 for a detailed survey.
6Here, the reason for emphasizing genders is that they have di¤erent fractions in income groups and
di¤erent average earnings.
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We allow for earning heterogeneity to embed progressive earning taxes (higher earners
pay higher taxes) and unemployment benets (in most countries, replacement rates are
higher for lower earning groups).
Employment Process There is wage heterogeneity in the model economy; how-
ever, there is no transition between the income groups. Therefore, each individual faces
income risk only through unemployment shocks. In each period, agents receive job of-
fers according to a stochastic process that is specied by a two-state Markov chain, .
If an agent receives a job o¤er, he/she has the opportunity to work for h^ hours (this
means labor is indivisible) and earn wage yij, depending on her/his gender and earning
group. If an agent does not receive a job o¤er or refuses a job o¤er, then he/she will be
unemployed for that period.
Household Preferences Agents enjoy utility from a consumption good, leisure and
a public good, and maximize their expected lifetime utility:
E
1X
t=0
tU(cijt ; l
ij
t ; G) (6)
where  is the discount factor, cijt is total consumption, and l
ij
t is the amount of time
devoted to leisure by an agent with gender i, and earning j at time t. The third factor
in the utility function is a public good, denoted by G, and provided by the government.7
The total consumption of an agent with gender i and earning j in period t equals:
cijt =
8><>: c
ij
m;t + '; if the agent is unemployed
cijm;t; if the agent is employed
9>=>;
where ' is home production and cijm;t is consumption of the market good for an agent with
gender i and earning j at time t. We assume that total consumption is the sum of market
7We include a public good to have a balanced government budget.
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consumption and home production. For simplicity, we assume that home production is
only possible when the agents are not working in the market.8 The home-produced goods
are assumed to be consumed within the period of production.9
The utility function follows:
U(c; l; G) =
(c1 l)1    1
1   +  log(G) (7)
The rst term in the utility function gives the utility from consumption and leisure. This
functional form is quite standard in the literature. The utility from the public good is
assumed to be logarithmic and separate from private consumption.
Agents do not have any private insurance besides a storage technology, which is a
non-interest bearing asset and accumulates as follows:
mijt+1 = m
ij
t + y
d;ij
t   cijm;t (8)
where mijt is the asset holdings, y
d;ij
t is the disposable income of an agent with gender i
and earning j at time t. The disposable income will be di¤erent from earning yjt , because
of the earning tax,  y, and unemployment benet eligibility. The disposable income of
individuals and the unemployment benet system are explained later on.
Unemployment Benets All agents who do not receive a job o¤er will receive
unemployment benets. Agents who refuse job o¤ers will receive unemployment bene-
ts with probability , which shows the level of monitoring in the model (1    is the
monitoring level). The level of monitoring is optimally chosen by the government to
8This is a simplifying assumption; however, allowing the working agents to do home production
would not change the result, because the important point is the di¤erence in home production during
unemployment and employment spells. Burda and Hamermesh 2010 show that, in the U.S., unemployed
agents do 10 hours per week more home production than employed agents do.
9Here, cmt can be interpreted as the consumption good that agents buy from the market and 'i can
be interpreted as the home production that agents do at home, such as cooking, cleaning, repairing,
child care, etc. The sum of the two components gives total consumption.
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maximize social welfare. Although better monitoring decreases the moral hazard prob-
lem, it is costly. We assume that the cost of monitoring is linearly increasing in the
monitoring level. The cost of monitoring is dened as:
() = (1  ) (9)
where  is a positive constant.
The unemployment insurance program can be summarized as the following scheme,
where  is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the agent receives benets, and 0 if
he/she does not receive benets:
No job o¤er )  = 1, gets benets
Gets an o¤er, accepts )  = 0; no benets
Gets an o¤er, rejects )  = 1 gets benets with probability 
 = 0 does not get benets with probability 1  
(10)
Upon qualifying for unemployment benets, an agent with previous earnings yij receives
an amount of yij(1   yij)yij, where yij is the net replacement rate for earning yij.10
Earning Tax and Disposable Income The government taxes earnings progres-
sively; that is, the rate of linear tax,  y, decreases as the level of earnings increases.
The earning tax system of each country is taken from the data and imposed on the
model exogenously. The government uses the tax revenues to nance the unemployment
insurance program and to provide a public good.
The disposable income of an agent is determined by employment status, level of
10Note that the replacement rate depends on the level of lost earnings; therefore, we have y, instead
of .
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earnings, and qualication for unemployment benets, and can be summarized as follows:
gets no o¤er (s = u); gets benet ( = 1)) yd;ijt = b (11)
gets no o¤er (s = u); no benet ( = 0)) yd;ijt = 0 (12)
gets o¤er (s = e); accepts ) yd;ijt = (1   yij)yij (13)
gets o¤er(s = e); rejects ; gets benet ( = 1)) yd;ijt = b (14)
gets o¤er (s = e); rejects ; no benet ( = 0)) yd;ijt = 0 (15)
where yd;ijt represents the disposable income of an agent in gender group i, and earning
group j at time t. An agent with no job o¤er receives unemployment insurance benets,
b = yij(1  yij)yij, if , the number of consecutive periods of benets received, is smaller
or equal to max, the maximum potential duration. He or she has 0 disposable income
after the maximum duration of benets is exhausted.
An employed agent has a disposable income that equals the after-tax earnings (1  
 yij)y
ij. An agent who qualies for benets (that is he or she is not monitored by the
government) upon refusing a job o¤er receives unemployment benets b if  is smaller
than or equal to max. If he or she does not qualify for the benets (that is he or she
is monitored) upon refusing a job o¤er, then he or she has 0 disposable income in that
period.
Recursive Formulations We formulate the problem of agents in a recursive form
to compute equilibrium numerically. To make the dynamic planning problem more un-
derstandable we analyze the problem in two cases.
No Job O¤er Case: Agents with no job o¤er, s = u, receive unemployment insurance
benets unless, , the number of consecutive periods of benets received is greater than
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max, the maximum number of consecutive periods of benets allowed. The generosity
of unemployment benets, y, is changing with the level of income. The problem of an
agent in gender group i, and earning group j who receives no job o¤er is to choose the
optimal amount of assets for the next period. As they do not work, their leisure time
will be equal to the total time endowment of 1:
V ij(m; s; ) =
max
m0
fU(m+ (1   yij)yijyij  m0 + '; 1) + E[(u; s0ij(m0; s0; 0)]g
subject to 0  m0
0 = + 1 if   max
0 = 0 if  = max
In the above equation, m denotes asset accumulation. Agents receive job o¤ers from a
two-state Markov process, which is denoted with (:; :). In this case, where an agent has
no job o¤er, the relevant transition probabilities should be the ones from the unemploy-
ment state to the others, (u; s0). E denotes the expectation operator.
Job O¤er Case: Agents who receive employment opportunities have the choice of
rejecting the job o¤er. This is where moral hazard comes in. As the government does
not monitor job o¤ers perfectly, agents may nd it optimal to reject the job o¤ers and
receive benets afterwards. The ones who reject the job o¤er will know whether they
receive benets or not upon refusing the job o¤er. Afterward, they make their consump-
tion/saving decisions. The ones who accept the job o¤er receive a constant wage and
do not have any further uncertainty, so they directly make their consumption/saving
decisions.
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V ij(m; s; ) =
maxfmax
m0
U(m+ (1   yij)yij  m0; 1  h^) + E[(e; s0ij(m0; s0; 0)];
max
m0
U(m+ (1   yij)yijyij  m0 + '; 1) + E[(e; s0ij(m0; s0; 0)]+
(1  )max
m0
U(m m0 + '; 1) + E[(e; s0ij(m0; s0; 0)]g
subject to 0  m0
0 = + 1 if   max
0 = 0 if  = max
Equilibrium An individual state is denoted with x = (i; j;m; s; ). Let (x) be
the invariant distribution of the agents, c(x) the consumption decision, m(x) the saving
decision, and (x) the employment decision. In the stationary competitive equilibrium,
the agents decision rules c(x) and m(x) solve the dynamic planning problem. The good
market clears,
X
x
(x)c(x) +G =
X
(x)(x)yij: (16)
The government has a balanced budget constraint. It collects taxes from all workers and
from the unemployed who get insurance and uses them to nance the unemployment
insurance payments and the remaining balance is used to provide a public good.
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X
(i; j;m; 1; )(i; j;m; 1; )yij yij| {z }
tax return from the workers
+
X
(i; j;m; 1; )(1  (i; j;m; 1; )) yijyij +
X
(i; j;m; 0; ) yijyij| {z }
tax return from the insured
 
X
f(i; j;m; 0; )yijyij + (1  )(i; j;m; 1; )(1  (i; j;m; 1; ))yijyijg| {z }
insurance expenditure
  G|{z}
public good expenditure
= 0
(17)
The invariant distribution should satisfy the following functional equation:
(i; j;m; s; ) =P
s0
P
m2

(s0; u)(i; j;m; u;   1) if s = u;   max and  > 0P
s0
P
m2

(s0; e)(1  (i; j;m; e;   1))(i; j;m; e;   1) if s = e;   max and  > 0P
s0
P
m2

(s0; e)(i; j;m; e; )(i; j;m; e; ) + (i; j;m; e; max) if s = e;  = 0P
s0
P
m2

(i; j;m; u; max) if s = u;  = 0
(18)
where 
 is dened as the set of state space that will give the optimal asset level m from
the model.
The government maximizes the total welfare subject to its budget constraint and cost
function.
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Max

P
x
(x)E[U(c(x); (x)]
subject to equations 9 and 17
(19)
5 Calibration
We calibrate the model parameters in three steps. In the rst step, we borrow the values
of some parameters from the literature and these parameters are assumed to be the same
for each country. We set  to 0.995, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of
4 %, and  to 0.67, both are standard in the literature. The value of parameter  is
set to 5, which corresponds to a risk aversion of 2.3, which is within the standard range
of 1.5-4.0 in the literature. We choose the values of the transition probability matrix
similar to those in Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992). The chosen transition matrix gives
an involuntary unemployment level of 5.66 %,11 and an average duration of 12 weeks
(two periods) without job o¤ers. The corresponding transition matrix is as follows:
264 :97 :03
:5 :5
375
In the second step of the calibration, we obtain the country-specic values of the
parameters that represent labor market conditions from the OECD database. The av-
erage hours of work, denoted by h^, is set to the empirical average working hours of
the corresponding country. We normalize this value by dividing working hours by total
hours. The values of parameters yij , , and  yij are set to replacement rate, potential
duration of unemployment benets and earning tax of the corresponding country. Note
that tax and replacement rates depend on earnings and features progressiveness. The
11The fraction of agents who do not receive a job o¤er.
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
 Discount factor 0.99
 Utility function 3
 Utility function .67
 Utility function 0.057
(e; e) Employment process .97
(u; e) Employment process .5
' Home production 0.067
 Monitoring cost 0.012
Notes: These parameters are common in calibration of
the model for each country. The country specic
parameters are reported in Table 3 and Table 4.
chosen parameter values are reported in Table 3.
The values of parameters yij and ji are calculated from the data for each country and
imposed on the model. The calculation method is explained in detail in the Appendix
and the calculated values are reported in Table 4.
Finally we calibrate the values of parameters ' and  to match the gender gaps across
countries. We do not calibrate these parameters separately for each country, but we use
the same values for each country to match the whole set of countries. The corresponding
values for the selected parameter are reported in Table 1.
6 Results
6.1 Model Predictions
To obtain the gender gaps in unemployment for each country, we solve the model for
each country separately. The model predictions are compared with the data in Figure 2.
One should keep in mind that we do not include some variables in the model that could
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Figure 2: Gender Gaps: Data vs Model
potentially improve our results.12 Among others, these additional variables could be
educational di¤erences across countries and di¤erent marriage and fertility rates across
countries. In fact, some of these factors are considered by Azmat et al. (2006), and they
are found to generate small gender gaps. So the small deviations from the data can be
attributed to these factors.
The heterogeneity in labor market conditions together with home production gener-
ates most of the heterogeneity in gender gaps across countries (Figure 2). The coe¢ cient
of variation in gender gaps is 1.96 and 1.72 in the empirical data and model, respectively.
The calibrated versions of the model for the high and moderate gender gap countries
match the empirical data quantitatvely. Among the moderate gender gap countries, the
only exception is France. The empirical level of the gender gap in France is around 3%;
12We can include only a certain number of factors in the model due to computational limitations.
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however, the model generates a gender gap below 1%. Among the zero and negative
gender gap countries, the models performance is quite well except for New Zealand and
the United Kingdom. Empirical gender gaps in these countries are -0.14% and -1.4%,
however the model generates 1.4% and 1%, respectively. This is a result of the fact
that the model we use contains only a limited number of economic factors that would
a¤ect the gender gap in unemployment. Imposing more country-specic factors would
probably improve the results for the aforementioned countries. We perform additional
quantitative exercises to see the e¤ect of specic factors on the rate of the gender gap
in unemployment. The results indicate that high taxes, high replacement rates, high
pay gaps and low productivity levels are associated with high unemployment rates and
gender gaps.
The rate of unemployment is determined by two dynamics: the rst is the exogenous
process that generates employment opportunities, and the other is the accept/reject
decisions of individuals. Since the exogenous process of employment opportunities is
the same for each country and gender, the heterogeneity in the unemployment rate
across genders and countries is created by the accept/reject decisions of individuals.
This decision is a¤ected by the key ingredients of the model, which are labor market
conditions, home production, and imperfect monitoring of job o¤ers (moral hazard).
In countries where there is no gender gap or small gender gaps, both women and
men tend to accept all job o¤ers. For the other countries, the decomposition shows
some heterogeneity. For example, gender gaps in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway, Canada, and Switzerland mostly arise coming from the decisions of women.
In these countries, men mostly tend to accept job o¤ers, while some women turn them
down. For Denmark, Finland, France, and Portugal the gender gap is a¤ected by both
female and male tendencies to refuse job o¤ers. In general, due to the interaction of labor
market conditions, gender pay gap and home production in these countries, women tend
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to refuse job o¤ers more than men, and that generates the gender gap in unemployment
in the model.
6.2 Contributions of Specic Factors to Gender Gaps in Un-
employment
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of specic factors on the quantitative results.13
We solve the model with various values of the pay gap, tax rate and replacement rate
parameters. At each exercise, we change one parameter and keep the rest xed to see
the e¤ect of the given parameter on the quantitative results.
In this exercise, we limit our attention to four countries: France, Italy, Norway and
the U.S. We choose these countries because they represent di¤erent kinds of economies.
The U.S. has comparatively low taxes on labor, low replacement rates, and comparatively
high working hours. France has high taxes, high replacement rate, and comparatively
low hours of work. Norway has high taxes, moderate replacement rate, and very low
hours of work. Italy has high taxes, low replacement rates and the moderate hours of
work. Due to this heterogeneity, the countries show various responses to the factors.14
6.2.1 Role of Replacement Rate
The e¤ect of unemployment benets on the rate of unemployment has always been an
important discussion in both Europe and the U.S. Economic theory suggests that unem-
ployment rates increase in response to increased unemployment benets by discouraging
13Taking taxes, replacement rate, and hours of work as state variables, and solving the unemployment
rates as a function of these variables would be ideal for this kind of analysis. Since this is computationally
infeasible, we do not solve the model across all possible combinations of these variables. Instead, we
take these variables from the data for each country and solve the model at those points only.
14In most of the gures in the following parts, we see some discontinuous behavior. The main reason
is the level of heterogeneity in the model. There are only three levels of earnings. So there are many
similar agents, who change their decisions at the same time, which causes the observed jumps in the
gures.
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job search intensity. The empirical literature reports weak positive relationship between
unemployment benets and unemployment rates.15 Our ndings suggest that the small
coe¢ cients might be due to nonlinearity of the relationship between the unemployment
rate and the benet levels. Our model implies that low levels of replacement rates do
not a¤ect the unemployment rates. However, after some threshold level it starts to cause
higher unemployment rates in our quantitative exercises.
For each selected country, we solve the model with various values of replacement rates
to see its quantitative e¤ect on results. The replacement rate of the median earner takes
the value of each .05 increment in [.05,.95] interval. Recall that we have a progressive
replacement rate prole (higher earnings in employment spells imply lower replacement
rates in unemployment spells). Therefore, we adjust the replacement rate of low and
high earning groups proportionately consistent with thedata.
Figure 3 reports the results. The values in the horizontal axis of the gure represent
the median earners replacement rate. The gure shows that in the calibrated model
for the French economy, the unemployment rate does not increase in response to the
changes in the replacement rate at moderate levels. This happens for two reasons:
rst, the high tax rates imply a high level of optimal monitoring for unemployment
benets qualication, because the cost of monitoring is nanced with taxes; second, the
average hours of work is low; therefore, the value of being unemployed (relative to being
employed) is smaller compared to the countries where the average hours of work is high.
That makes employment stable in the model economy when calibrated to French data.
Moreover, female unemployment starts to increase when replacement rates are more than
80% of lost earnings due to the lower earnings of women in this economy. For Norway,
unemployment responds similarly for the same reasons. However, female unemployment
is stable even at very high replacement rates, because the pay gap is very small and
15See Krueger and Meyer 2002 for a detailed survey.
24
Figure 3: Replacement Rates vs Gender Gap in Unemployment
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average earning is very high in this economy.
When we calibrate the model to the U.S. data, the model economy responds similar to
France in terms of increasing unemployment rates with increased unemployment benets.
However, the reason for the increase in unemployment is high working hours rather than
high earning taxes.
In the model economy for Italy, the unemployment rate for females increases even
with low replacement rates. This is because of the very large pay gap in this economy.
The male unemployment rate is stable until the 50% replacement rate and increases after
then.
6.2.2 Role of Taxes
In the model, the tax rate is a determinant of the unemployment rate, since it a¤ects
the value of employment through earnings. Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of taxes on the
unemployment rates of females and males. We look at the e¤ects of taxes from 5%
to 70% with 5% increments, and we x the values of the rest of the parameters. As
depicted in the gure, the rate of tax is quantitatively important. As the rate of tax
increases, agents tend to refuse job o¤ers, because the value of employment decreases
through reduced after-tax earnings. The responses of unemployment rates to an increase
in tax rates di¤er across countries, because there is heterogeneity in their labor market
conditions. For the U.S. and Italy, unemployment rates increase immediately above 30-
40% of taxes on earnings. This is because of the high hours of work - which reduces the
relative value of employment - in these countries. Note that Italy is more responsive to
taxes, because average earnings are smaller in this country. We also observe an increase
in the gender gap in unemployment in both countries. It increases more in Italy, because
the pay gap is much larger compared to the U.S.
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Figure 4: Earning Tax Rate vs Gender Gap in Unemployment
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In the calibration of our model for France, unemployment increases after 60% of
earnings tax. In France, the threshold level of taxes that creates high unemployment is
higher compared to the U.S. and Italy due to the lower average hours of work in this
economy. In the model economy for Norway, the unemployment rate does not increase,
although the tax level increases up to 70%. This is due to the very high average earnings
and very low average hours of work, which creates a high value for employment in this
economy.
6.2.3 Role of Pay Gap
In this exercise the ratio of the average earnings of women to the average earnings of
men takes values between 0.50 and 0.95 with 0.05 increments. The results show that in
the calibrated versions of our model for France, Italy, and the U.S., the gender gap in
unemployment is increasing with the increase in the pay gap between men and women.
The rate of increase in the gender gap in unemployment depends on the labor market
conditions in these economies. In Italy and France, even low levels of the pay gap create a
gender gap in unemployment due to high earning taxes. In the U.S. economy, the gender
gap in unemployment happens after moderate levels of pay gaps due to low earning taxes.
In the model economy for Norway, even if the pay gap becomes very large, the gender
gap in unemployment does not increase due to very low hours of work and high average
earnings in this economy. The results are reported in Figure 5.
6.2.4 Role of Productivity
In this section, we analyze the e¤ect of productivity levels on the rate of male and
female unemployment. For each country, we consider productivity levels between .20
and 1.00. Figure 6 shows the response of each country to the changes in productivity
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Figure 5: Pay Gender Gap vs Gender Gap in Unemployment
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levels. The economies of France, Italy and the United States respond similarly: the
gender gap in unemployment starts from about .40 and diminishes gradually and goes
to 0 as productivity increases. However, in Norway, the gender gap in unemployment
gets zero much earlier than in the other three economies. This is due to very low average
hours of work in this economy. Low hours of work increase the value of employment and
workers stop rejecting job o¤ers right after the wage rate goes above .30.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
We propose a mechanism that can generate most of the gender gaps in the unemployment
rate observed in most of the OECD countries. The components of the mechanism are
home production, pay gaps, unemployment benets, earning taxes, hours of work and
imperfect government monitoring of job o¤ers. We further investigate the e¤ect of specic
factors on gender gaps in unemployment. All of the ingredients seem to have quantitative
importance.
Our quantitative exercises also o¤er some explanation for the high unemployment
rates in Europe. Our model implies that high replacement rates and high earning taxes
reduce employment. Since earning taxes and replacement rates increased in Europe
between 1960 and the 1980s, we guess that this might have contributed to the high
unemployment rates in Europe.
In the model, we assume that governments choose the monitoring levels optimally.
In a dynamic setting if the governments cannot adjust their monitoring levels spon-
taneously, we will see high unemployment levels. From the governmentsperspective,
while decreasing the level of unemployment insurance benet will put political pressure
on them, most people will agree on better monitoring levels. After the success story
of the Danish economy in lowering their unemployment level, other countries made its
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Figure 6: Productivity vs Gender Gap in Unemployment
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unemployment insurance criteria stricter. This seems to work for them also.
Extending the model by adding a costly search decision is the next step. The model
will have implications for labor force participation, which di¤ers across countries, along
with unemployment levels. Another extension is endogenizing the stochastic process in
the model by adding the rm side of the search. With this model, it will be possible to
see the e¤ects of policies more broadly. The model will have the potential to propose a
mechanism that can generate unemployment levels over time and across countries.
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Table 2: Gender Gaps in Unemployment
5 Year Average 10 Year Average 20 Year Average
Australia -0.62 -0.77 -0.08
Austria 0.36 0.53 0.42
Belgium 2.54 3.63 6.78
Canada -0.62 -0.75 -0.34
Denmark 1.26 1.66 1.69
Finland 0.96 -0.16 -0.72
France 3.28 3.53 4.39
Germany 0.48 1.32 1.3
Greece 9.26 8.81 7.78
Iceland 0.6 0.6 0.61
Ireland -0.48 -0.21 -0.28
Italy 6.34 6.78 8.72
Japan -0.36 -0.11 -0.02
Netherlands 1.5 2.07 2.18
New Zealand -0.14 -0.25 -0.31
Norway -0.24 -0.41 -0.07
Portugal 1.8 1.83 4.22
Spain 10.5 11.38 10.09
Sweden -0.74 -1.32 -0.61
Switzerland 0.92 0.83 0.63
UK -1.36 -2.47 -2.54
US 0.04 -0.05 -0.06
Mean 1.60 1.66 1.99
St. Dev. 3.16 3.39 3.47
Notes: 5-year averages are computed by averaging over gender gaps between years 1997-2002. The
10-year and 20-year averages are obtained similarly. The data is comparable across countries, because
ILO denition of unemployment is used for each country. Source: World Development Indicators
(2004).
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Table 3: Labor Market Data
L M H max h^ L M H
% % % years hours % % %
Australia 45 31 23 4 1870 39.4 35.6 45.0
Austria 55 55 55 2 1600 56.3 59.9 41.4
Belgium 83 63 46 4 1580 71.3 66.5 68.4
Canada 65 62 43 1 1740 34.2 40.7 35.9
Denmark 84 61 47 2.5 1510 42.1 43.5 62.8
Finland 73 60 48 2 1770 52.8 56.9 56.9
France 77 73 67 3 1650 63.2 52.0 59.7
Germany 62 61 62 4 1600 58.1 63.3 44.3
Greece 71 48 34 1 1900 50.8 50.8 57.4
Ireland 42 30 23 4 1750 35.9 54.8 54.8
Italy 50 54 46 0.5 1730 53.6 53.6 61.5
Japan 70 60 50 0.5 1960 29.9 34.2 33.6
Netherlands 81 71 59 2 1510 49.0 46.5 50.0
New Zealand 53 37 26 4 1830 21.0 34.0 38.0
Norway 65 66 53 1.5 1430 43.1 51.1 53.7
Portugal 81 78 84 0.8 2000 47.1 47.1 55.6
Spain 76 69 48 3.5 1820 45.2 48.1 37.0
Sweden 82 77 55 1.2 1510 46.3 47.9 66.9
Switzerland 80 70 71 1 1640 32.5 35.8 42.6
United Kingdom 63 45 31 4 1750 38.8 38.8 47.7
United States 62 62 45 0.5 1940 34.4 34.4 43.7
Mean 67.62 58.71 48.38 2.24 1718.57 45.00 47.40 50.33
St. Dev. 12.99 13.79 15.63 1.39 164.66 11.97 9.84 10.47
Notes: L, M , and H denote the replacement rate for low, medium and high earning groups. It is
dened as the ratio of unemployment benet level to labor income prior to unemployment. max is the
maximum potential length of benet receipt. h^ is the average annual hours of worked per worker. L,
M , and H denote the tax rates for low, medium and high earning groups. Sources: Nickell
(1997,2003), OECD Benets and Wages (2002, 2004), OECD Employment Outlook (2005).
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Table 4: Labor Market Data, Contd
yL yM yH Lf 
M
f 
H
f 
L
m 
M
m 
H
m
Australia 0.696 1.038 1.734 0.137 0.310 0.002 0.077 0.414 0.060
Austria 0.694 1.036 1.731 0.089 0.362 0.000 0.023 0.514 0.012
Belgium 0.592 0.884 1.476 0.230 0.213 0.000 0.037 0.432 0.088
Canada 0.655 0.977 1.632 0.191 0.264 0.012 0.122 0.277 0.134
Denmark 0.682 1.017 1.699 0.172 0.278 0.023 0.128 0.286 0.114
Finland 0.636 0.950 1.586 0.189 0.259 0.037 0.141 0.239 0.136
France 0.561 0.838 1.399 0.169 0.292 0.000 0.044 0.430 0.064
Germany 0.576 0.859 1.435 0.181 0.272 0.000 0.063 0.397 0.087
Greece 0.451 0.673 1.125 0.209 0.192 0.001 0.115 0.335 0.149
Ireland 0.699 1.044 1.743 0.199 0.217 0.008 0.142 0.271 0.164
Italy 0.541 0.807 1.348 0.216 0.174 0.007 0.170 0.228 0.205
Japan 0.539 0.805 1.344 0.251 0.164 0.000 0.096 0.330 0.160
Netherlands 0.677 1.010 1.687 0.177 0.267 0.006 0.111 0.321 0.117
New Zealand 0.521 0.777 1.298 0.141 0.310 0.002 0.075 0.410 0.062
Norway 0.896 1.337 2.233 0.123 0.352 0.003 0.072 0.407 0.044
Portugal 0.386 0.575 0.961 0.201 0.245 0.011 0.131 0.261 0.152
Spain 0.479 0.715 1.194 0.232 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.586 0.001
Sweden 0.732 1.093 1.825 0.160 0.283 0.041 0.136 0.284 0.096
Switzerland 0.714 1.065 1.779 0.168 0.286 0.002 0.084 0.370 0.091
United Kingdom 0.634 0.946 1.579 0.174 0.264 0.016 0.129 0.295 0.123
United States 0.799 1.192 1.991 0.197 0.238 0.023 0.146 0.238 0.158
Notes: yL, yM , and yH denote 0.67, 1, and 1.67 times the average earnings in the corresponding
country. We categorize the earnings in these three groups so that we can apply the progressive earning
tax and replacement rates for these three groups. Li , 
H
i , and 
M
i denote the fraction of population
with gender i and earning level less than or equal to yL, more than yH , and in between yL and yH in
the corresponding country, where i 2 ff;mg. Note that PiPj ji = 1, that is the measure of the
population is normalized to 1. For the detailed explanation of the calculations, see Section 9. Data
source: OECD Statistics.
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9 Appendix
OECD Statistics provide data on tax rates and replacement rates for three earning groups
in each country. Those earning groups are 0.67, 1, and 1.67 times average earnings in
the corresponding country. We would like to reect this fact in the model, because it is
an important determinant of the value of employment and unemployment. In order to
incorporate this fact into the model properly, we need to determine the distribution of
population with respect to gender and earning groups. We approximate this distribution
for each country by the following steps:
 Calculating average earnings (comparable across countries):
We obtain the ratio of average earnings of women over men for each country
k, rk, from OECD. We set ~ykf = r, and ~y
k
m = 1.
For each country k, we dene ykf = ~y
k
f  gdpk, and ykm = ~ykm  gdpk, which are
cross-country comparable average earnings of women and men for each coun-
try. gdpi denotes GDP per capita for country i, comparable across countries,
OECD average equals 1.
 Calculating fractions of earning-gender groups in each country k (jki ), where i 2
ff;mg, and j 2 fL;M;Hg. L stands for low, M stands for medium and H stands
for high earning group:
We assume earnings of women and men in country k are distributed normally:
yki  N(yki ; yki ), where i 2 ff;mg.
We need to know ykf and ykm in order to gure out fractions 
jk
i .
OECD provides coe¢ cient of variation for the earnings of the whole working
population. We assume that the coe¢ cient of variation for women and men
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equal to this reported value. Since, we assume the following equalities: CV kf =
CV km = CV
k = ykf =y
k
f = ykm=y
k
m.
We extract ykf , and ykm from the above equalities.
Once we have ykf , y
k
m, ykf , and ykm, we can calculate P
Lk
i = P (y
k
i < y
Lk),
PHki = P (y
k
i > y
Hk), and PMki = P (y
Lk < yki < y
Hk) for each i 2 ff;mg
under the assumption of normal distribution.
The fractions for each country k, jki , can be calculated by multiplying each
P jki by L
k
i =(L
k
i + L
k
 i) which weights each gender by their labor force partic-
ipation rates, and normalizes the measure of population to 1. (Note that we
implicitly assume population have equal number of women and men.)
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